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INTRODUCTION
An agreement on climate finance is crucial to ensure an equitable approach
between developed and developing countries in the fight against climate change.
Given their economic capabilities and their historical responsibility for global
warming, developed countries are expected to bear the majority of the costs
associated with global climate action. The Cancun Agreements formalise a com-
mitment by developed countries to jointly provide USD 30 billion for the period
between 2010 and 2012 and USD 100 billion annually by 2020 for developing
countries. This funding will be balanced between adaptation and mitigation and
is destined primarily for the most vulnerable developing countries. The objective
is to help developing countries adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change
and to undertake mitigation actions so as to bring them towards a low-carbon
economy.
This report addresses the following question: How is it possible to secure a
framework for mobilising, managing and delivering financing on the necessary
scale? Without a credible framework, the risk remains that developing coun-
tries’ actions to tackle climate change will be insufficient, inefficient, inadequate
and delayed. The global costs would thereby increase and the path towards a
low-carbon future would be jeopardized.
With regard to mobilisation, the report of the High Level Advisory Group on
Climate Change Financing – mandated by the UN Secretary-General to study
the contribution of potential sources of revenue towards meeting the USD 100
billion per year by 2020 – has concluded that this goal is challenging but feasi-
ble.1 The Cancun Agreements stipulate that the money will come from various
sources, public and private, multilateral and bilateral, including alternative
sources. However, how developed countries will raise new and additional funds
to close the gap in finances to attain the USD 100 billion per year is unclear,
especially in a period of economic and financial crisis. While a lot of innovative
ways of financing climate change exist, the debate is highly political and raises
very contentious questions.
As for the management of climate finance, the Cancun Agreements establish a
Green Climate Fund (GCF) to help developing countries finance the fight
against climate change in the long-term. However, many questions require fur-
ther clarification about the design of the GCF and the way it will interact with
1. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, 5
November 2010, http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/Documents/AGF_reports/
AGF_Final_Report.pdfFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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the intricate network of existing funds. In order to improve the effectiveness of
the administration of international climate finance over time, transparency and
accountability will need to be enhanced.
The final step – the delivery – is fundamental when assessing the effectiveness,
efficiency and fairness of climate finance. Yet, many questions remained unan-
swered; how can we ensure direct access to funding for developing countries?
How can we reach a fairer distribution of funds between developing countries,
as well as between mitigation and adaptation? How can the money be made
available in a timely manner? And, what modalities of payment should be used?
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 considers what is required in terms
of climate finance to tackle climate change. Section 2, 3 and 4 respectively ana-
lyse the issues linked to the mobilisation, administration and delivery of climate
financing. Section 5 briefly examines the EU’s fast start financing and long-term
financing in light of what has been said regarding the mobilisation, administra-
tion and delivery of funds. Finally, the conclusion outlines some key insights on
how an effective mobilisation, administration and delivery of climate financing
could be reached over time.
Clémentine d’Oultremont
Research Fellow in European Affairs
Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations5
1. WHAT IS NEEDED?
Tackling climate change will require substantial financial and investment flows
to support mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries. Over-
coming this challenge will largely depend on the rapidity and the efficiency of
the global response. As stated by the Stern Report, the benefits of strong and
early action far outweigh the economic costs of failing to act.
1.1. Estimating global needs for mitigation and 
adaptation
In order to limit the rise in global temperature to no more than 2°C, significant
abatement of emissions will be needed from both developed and developing
countries. Developing countries will be able to reach some emissions reductions
at negative costs, particularly through improved energy efficiency. However, the
major part of abatement will incur additional costs. This share should be taken
on by developed countries on the basis of the “agreed incremental cost”.2 The
incremental cost is the additional cost incurred when undertaking a climate-
friendly action, compared to the economic cost of the activity in a business-as-
usual scenario. 
Estimating the incremental costs of mitigation and adaptation actions in devel-
oping countries is very difficult. Currently, the main method available is a global
top-down approach.3 When one looks at the largely different figures coming
from diverse evaluations, it is clear that this method is far from conclusive (see
Table 1 and 2). In order to have appropriate estimates, regional or national
bottom-up assessments are needed. These assessments should be based on policy
choices in accordance with specific needs. Whereas the majority of countries are
currently discussing which climate policies are the most effective, a substantial
part of these assessments are still sorely missing.
2. Project Catalyst, “Financial Architecture”, Project Catalyst Brief, August 2010, http://www.project-cat-
alyst.info/images/publications/100825_project_catalyst_financial_architecture_aug25_final.pdf
3. N. BIRD and J. BROWN, “International Climate finance: Principles for European Support to Developing
Countries”, EDC2020 Working Paper, March 2010, p. 4, http://www.edc2020.eu/fileadmin/publications/
EDC_2020_Working_Paper_No_6.pdfFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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1.1.1. Mitigation
Steering the global economy in a low-carbon direction requires increasingly
important investment and financial flows to reduce GHG emissions, particu-
larly in energy supply, industry, buildings, transportation, waste, agriculture,
forestry, research and development (R&D) and deployment of climate-friendly
technologies.
Investment and financial flows for reducing GHG emissions in developing coun-
tries are expected to be particularly cost-effective. While only 46% of the total
funds needed should be directed towards developing countries by 2030, it is
estimated that two-thirds (68%) of the global emission reduction potential will
be achieved in these countries.4
It is worth noting that more than half of the developing countries’ mitigation
potential is in forestry.5 Financing the reduction of emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation (REDD+) requires far less resources than investing in
new low-carbon technologies. It is thus a cost-effective means for large emis-
sions reductions in the short and medium term.
According to the various estimates given in table 1, the incremental costs
required to mitigate climate change in developing countries could range from
USD 92 to USD 175 billion per year by 2030.
Table 1: Estimating incremental mitigation costs
Source: Climate Funds update, available on: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/resources/estimated-
costs-climate-change
4. UNFCCC, “Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change”, October 2007, available on:
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/4053.php
5. Global Canopy Programme, “The Little Climate Finance Book – A guide to financing options for for-
ests and climate change”, 2009, p.22, available on http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4619.pdf
Sources of estimate 
($bn per annum)
2010-
2020 2020 2030 Assumptions
European Commission 
(2009)
  118   In 2005 prices ($1.25 to €1 exchange rate, total net 
additional (“incremental”) costs, assuming suc-
cessful agreement -30% reduction for developed 
countries by 2020 compared to 1990, and NAMAs 
by developing countries.
McKinsey & Co (2009) 81-113   175 In 2005 prices, includes tech R&D 
Pacific Northwest National 
Lab (2008)
    139 Taken from World Bank World development 
Report (2010)
UNFCCC (2007)     92-97 In 2005 prices
Project Catalyst (2009) 69-100     In 2005 prices, 450 ppm stabilisation case
G77 + China (2009)   200-400   Estimate includes both Adaptation and Mitigation. 
Proposed at: 0.5% to 1% of GNP of Annex II Parties 
African Group (2009)   200   0.5% of GDP of Annex II PartiesFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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In the short to medium term, international public funding and other official
flows will be paramount for capacity building, R&D, deployment of new tech-
nologies, correcting market imperfections and leveraging private finance in
developing countries. However, the main sources of finance to support invest-
ment in mitigation activities in the long-term will come from the private sector,
in particular via market-based mechanisms. To date, the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) has been the main source of mitigation finance for develop-
ing countries. It allows both governments and the private sector from developed
countries to fulfil part of their climate obligations by investing in emission-
reduction projects in developing countries. Section 2.1.2 will further analyse the
CDM; the several design and operational shortcomings as well as the improve-
ments that should be made in the future.
According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007, future
energy infrastructure investments are expected to total over USD 20 trillion
between 2007 and 2030. A large portion of these investments will be made in
developing countries. As the lifetime of these infrastructures generally lasts
thirty years or more, these large investments must be directed towards climate-
friendly technologies. This will ensure we are not trapped in a high-carbon glo-
bal economy. Failure to act now will have a long-term impact on greenhouse gas
emissions, increasing both mitigation and adaptation costs.
1.1.2. Adaptation
At the UN Summit in December 2010, adaptation has been given as much pri-
ority as mitigation. Adverse effects from atmospheric warming have already
occurred in a number of countries and will continue in the years ahead even
under the most optimistic scenarios. Actions involving significant adaptation
measures will be required in many sectors, such as water supply, agriculture,
forestry, health care, beach nourishment and new infrastructure.
The incremental costs required for adaptation in developing countries are even
harder to estimate than those required for mitigation. Actions surrounding cli-
mate adaptation are widespread and diverse. They are also often directly linked
to support for sustainable development, making it particularly difficult to iden-
tify their incremental costs relative to a development as usual scenario.6 Further-
more, estimates on the level of damage incurred from climate change will also
vary depending on our ability to act on mitigation in the long-term.
6. J. BROWN and N. KAUR, “Financing adaptation: matching form with function”, Overseas Development
institute, Background Paper, December 2009, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=
4184&title=climate-change-finance-adaptation-background-noteFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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The estimates of the incremental costs of adaptation in developing countries by
2030 are thus very assorted. While the UNFCCC estimates they could range
from USD 28 to USD 67 billion per year7, the World Bank considers they could
range from USD 70 to USD 100 billion per year.8 As for the International Insti-
tute for Environment and Development (IIED), adaptation costs by 2030 are
estimated to 2 to 3 times higher than UNFCCC figures.9 Therefore, more
regional and sector based assessments on the incremental costs of adaptation are
needed to support effective global action against the adverse effects of climate
change.
Table 2: Estimating incremental adaptation costs
Source: Climate Funds update, available on http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/resources/estimated-
costs-climate-change
1.2. Mind the financing gap
Ensuring that adequate financing is provided to address climate change remains
a highly political and contentious issue within international climate negotia-
tions. The amount of financing required to tackle climate change will depend on
7. UNFCCC (2007), op. cit. note 4.
8. The World Bank Group, “The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change”, Washington DC, August
2010, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCC/Resources/EACC_FinalSynthesisReport0803_2010.pdf
9. M. PARRY et al., “Assessing the costs of Adaptation to climate change: A critique of the UNFCCC esti-
mates”, International Institute for Environment and Development, August 2009, http://pubs.iied.org/
11501IIED.html
Sources of estimate ($bn 
per annum) 2010-2015 2020 2030 Assumptions
European Commission 
(2009)
  13-30   In 2005 prices ($1.25 to €1 exchange rate, total 
net additional (“incremental”) costs, assuming 
successful agreement -30% reduction for devel-
oped countries by 2020 compared to 1990, and 
NAMAs by developing countries.
World Bank (2006) 9-41     450 ppm stabilisation case
Stern Review (2006) 4-37     450 ppm stabilisation case
UNDP HDR (2007) 83-105     450 ppm stabilisation case
UNFCCC (2007)     28-67 450 ppm stabilisation case
World Bank EACC (2010)     70-100 In 2005 prices, average annual costs between 
2010-2050. Additional public sector costs, not 
costs incurred by private agents.
G77 + China (2009)   200-400   Estimate includes both Adaptation and Mitiga-
tion. Proposed at: 0.5% to 1% of GNP of Annex 
II Parties 
African Group (2009)   >67   Estimate based on the programme for Adapta-
tion Action under the AWG-LCA
IIED (2009) No specific 
figures cited
Costs estimated to 2 or 3 times higher than 
UNFCCC figuresFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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many factors, including “the level of ambition of mitigation goals and adapta-
tion objectives, and the extent to which “correct” price signals are provided.10”
During the UN Climate Change Conference in December 2009 in Copenhagen,
an important first step was made. Developed countries committed to jointly
mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020 from both public and private
sources. In addition, they have pledged new and additional resources amounting
to USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012. This funding will be balanced
between adaptation and mitigation and is destined primarily for the most vul-
nerable developing countries. In addition to formalizing these two commit-
ments, the Cancun Agreements of December 2010 also foresee the establishment
of a Green Climate Fund under the Conference of the Parties through which
much of the funding will be channelled.
However, Parties have so far not agreed on a mid-term financial plan which
should address the gap between the annual USD 10 billion until 2012, known
as “fast-start financing” and the yearly 100 billion by 2020 which is labelled as
long-term financing. Moreover, although the amount of long-term financing has
been set in accordance with the goal of maintaining the temperature rise below
2°C, the amount of financial support will need to be continually scaled-up
beyond the USD 100 billion target after 2020. According to the aforementioned
estimations given by McKinsey & Co and the World Bank, the financial needs
required for mitigation and adaptation could easily expand to USD 275 billion
by 2030 (see table 1 and 2).
According to the last update of the World Resources Institute published in May
201111, individual fast start finance pledges from 21 developed countries and
the European Commission amount to USD 28.14 billion. While this puts devel-
oped countries on the right track, much remains to be done to meet the fast-start
pledges. In the Cancun Agreements, it has been confirmed that fast-start funds
have a “balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation”, are “new and
additional”, are “prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries”, and
include “investments through international institutions”. However, these crite-
ria must be clearly defined in order to avoid the possibility of wide and politi-
cally convenient interpretations on the part of developed countries as is pres-
ently the case. Fast start finance is often referred to as a pilot period to enable
10. OECD, “Financing Climate Change Action and Boosting Technology Change – Key messages and rec-
ommendations from current OECD work”, 10 March 2011, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/44/
46534686.pdf
11. A. BALLESTEROS, C. POLYCARP, K. STASIO, E. CHESSIN and C. EASTON, “Summary of Developed Coun-
try ‘Fast-Start’ Climate Finance Pledges”, World Resources Institute, 20 May 2011, http://www.wri.org/
publication/summary-of-developed-country-fast-start-climate-finance-pledges#qandaFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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“readiness” for the post-2012 period. It will therefore provide important lessons
on how best to finance preventative climate change actions in the long term.
So far, it is unclear how scaled-up, new and additional funding will be raised to
mobilise up to a USD 100 billion per year by 2020. Bridging the financial gap
will require innovative approaches, both in terms of additional finances and
effective use of available resources.
Without a credible framework for mobilising, managing and delivering financ-
ing on the required scale, there is a risk that developing countries’ actions to
tackle climate change will be insufficient, inefficient, inadequate, and delayed.
The global costs would increase as a result, and the path towards a sustainable
economic model would be jeopardized. The following sections will analyse the
issues related to the mobilisation, management and the delivery of the funds.11
2. MOBILISING THE FUNDING
2.1. Where should the money come from?
Developed countries reaffirmed in the Cancun Agreements their commitment
made a year earlier in Copenhagen to mobilise USD 100 billion a year by 2020
for developing countries. Nevertheless, there is little clarity on where this money
should come from. The agreement only stipulates that the money will “come
from various sources, public and private, multilateral and bilateral, including
alternative sources.”
It is increasingly likely that the majority of climate funding will come from the
private sector. An over-reliance on private financing has been criticised by many
as unpredictable as it is overly dependent on fluctuant market forces. These con-
cerns are well grounded in light of the recent decrease of interest in the carbon
market. However, the current budget constraints in most developed countries
will make public climate finance very difficult to increase. The emission reduc-
tions pledged by developed countries during the last climate negotiations cannot
be kept without a far more substantial contribution from the private sector than
is currently the case.
In the aftermath of the Copenhagen Summit, the UN Secretary-General estab-
lished a High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) with
a 10 month mandate. This Group was mandated to study the contribution of
potential sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, towards
meeting the USD 100 billion goal. The final report, issued in November 2010,
concluded that this goal is “challenging but feasible”. It is important to under-
line that the task of the AGF was not to reach a deal on the sources of finance
to achieve the long-term financing goal but to provide an important contribu-
tion to the climate negotiations.
The AGF emphasised the importance of new public instruments based on car-
bon emissions pricing for mobilising both public and private climate financing.
These instruments are particularly appealing because “they both raise revenue
and provide incentives for mitigation action.” A carbon price in the range of
USD 20 – USD 25 per ton of CO2 equivalent in 2020 was estimated by the AGF
as a central element for reaching the USD 100 billion a year.
A lot of innovative ways of financing climate change exist. The range of sources
identified by the Advisory Group can be classified into four groups which willFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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be analysed below: public finance, carbon market offsets, private capital and
development bank instruments. However, whilst recognising that there was a
complementary role to be played by each of these financing groups, no agree-
ment has been reached in Cancun on the sources of funding. What’s more, the
Parties were unable to agree on the role of the private sector in climate financing,
as well as on the adequate mechanisms for its involvement. The debate is highly
political and touches upon very contentious issues. Therefore, such concerns
should also be discussed outside of the UNFCCC, in other informal political
settings such as the G20 or the Major Emitters Forum.
2.1.1. Public finance
Scaling-up public finance will be difficult given the tightening of government
budgets in the wake of the global economic crisis, but it should not be a reason
to delay action. Scaled-up public finance will be particularly needed for financ-
ing adaptation where the involvement of private funding will be weaker. It is to
the poor developing countries – often suffering the most from the impacts of
climate change and unable to bear the costs – that adaptation funding must first
be directed. Within the next few years, public finance will also focus on support-
ing developing countries in their transition via capacity building, technical
assistance and pilot actions. Although mitigation will mainly be financed by the
private sector, public finance will be essential to leverage private investments. It
will be equally needed for actions unlikely to attract sufficient private funding,
particularly in poor countries.
Public sources of financing can be delivered via two main modalities; grants or
concessional loans. However, public sources are, in principle, available to be
used directly for grants. They are disbursed to beneficiaries through multilateral
and bilateral funds.
Before delving into the proposals of public financing instruments established by
the AGF, it is important to underline that the potential revenues generated by
these instruments will mainly depend on the share allocated to international
climate finance and the carbon price.
 Direct budget contribution
Direct budget contributions include the revenues provided through national
budgetary decisions. Despite the great budgetary pressure that Governments are
facing, these contributions continue to play a key role. Most of the USD 30
billion committed over the fast-start finance period is expected to come directly
from budget contributions. However, in the longer term, it would be difficult forFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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governments to increase these contributions, as it would reduce public expendi-
ture for other public policies. Considering that many developed countries are
already struggling to reduce their budget deficits, increasing direct public contri-
butions is an equally difficult political challenge as the introduction of new ins-
truments to generate resources.
 Revenues from international auctioning of emission allowances
A proposal, originally submitted by Norway, would auction a fraction of each
country’s emission allowances, more officially referred to as assigned amount
units (AAUs). The AGF estimates that in a medium carbon price scenario of
USD 25 per tonne of CO2, auctioning between 2 and 10 per cent of emissions
allowances would provide between USD 8 and 38 billion annually. A similar
system already exists.
However, the Commission Staff Working Document of April 201112 put for-
ward three main barriers to this approach. First, it would require dealing with
the issue of surplus AAUs from the first commitment period under the Kyoto
Protocol. If this surplus is carried over into the next commitment period, it could
greatly weaken the ‘stringency’ of the emissions reduction targets. Second, if the
current framework of the Kyoto Protocol was to be extended after 2012, the US
and the emerging market economies would be exempt from contributing. Third,
the revenue potential of this approach is unpredictable as it will depend on the
AAUs price and the success of auctioning.
 Revenues from auctioning of emission allowances in domestic emission 
trading schemes
An important source of additional public revenues is via the auctioning of allo-
wances in domestic emissions trading schemes (ETSs), under the condition that
an agreed percentage of the auction revenues is made available to finance cli-
mate change in developing countries. These domestic ETSs are in operation or
under consideration in most developed countries.
In the EU ETS, the expected revenues stemming from auctioning should amount
to around EUR 55 billion yearly for the period 2012 to 2080.13 However, this
is a rough estimate as these revenues will depend largely on the market price and
the way participants respond to it. The ETS Directive proposes that at least half
12. Commission Staff Working Document, “Scaling up international climate finance after 2012”, SEC
(2011) 487 final, 08 April 2011.
13. N. FUJIWARA, A. GEORGIEV and C. EGENHOFER, “Financing Mitigation and Adaptation: Where should
the funds come from and how should they be delivered?”, ECP Report No. 7, December 2008, p. 5, http:/
/www.ceps.eu/node/1568.FINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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the revenue should be used to support mitigation and adaptation efforts, mainly
within the EU, but also in developing countries.
 Revenues from offset levies (CDM)
This proposal would involve withholding a share of revenues from carbon off-
setting as a global source of funding. Carbon offsetting allows developed coun-
tries that have emission reduction targets to meet their obligations by investing
in emission reduction projects in other countries. So far, the most important
offset mechanism is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This latter
allows investments in mitigation projects in developing countries only.
This system already provides the Adaptation Fund (AF) with the majority of its
funds through a 2% levy on the proceeds from CDM projects. According to the
AGF, if the rate of the levy is kept at 2%, the annual revenues from carbon
offsetting by 2020 could range from USD 0.15 to USD 0.24 billon in case of low
carbon price scenario, and add up to USD 3 billion in case of high carbon price
scenario. Although these amounts are not negligible, the AGF points out that an
offset levy is a kind of tax on emission reductions, rather than a tax on emis-
sions.
 Revenues from taxes on international aviation and shipping
Putting a price on carbon emissions from international aviation and shipping
could also generate important public revenues for climate action in developing
countries. In order to do so, three alternative approaches are considered: a levy
on maritime bunker/aviation jet fuel consumption for international journeys, a
tax on passenger tickets for international flights, and an emissions trading
scheme. The latter proposal would involve the auctioning of international avia-
tion and maritime allowances in a separate emission trading scheme for these
activities. As these sectors are by definition international, these instruments
should be applied globally in order to, inter alia, avoid important competitive-
ness issues and preferential treatment between operators from developed and
developing countries. However, as rightly stated by the AGF, “these instruments
may present difficulties in terms of political acceptability and incidence on deve-
loping countries.” To ensure respect of the principle of common but differenti-
ated responsibilities, some members of the AGF and the European Commis-
sion14 proposed that a part of the revenues raised from internal transportation
be redistributed to developing countries.
14. Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Stepping up international climate
finance: A European blueprint for the Copenhagen deal”, COM (2009) 475/3, Brussels, October 2009.FINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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Taking into account the redistribution of part of the revenues to developing
countries and assuming that between 25 and 50% of the remaining revenues
could be earmarked for climate finance, the AGF estimates that the revenues in
2020 could range from USD 2 to USD 3 billion from international aviation
emissions15, and from USD 4 to USD 9 billion from international maritime emis-
sions (in the medium carbon price scenario). In order to be able to raise such
revenues, further work is required at the global level in the relevant organisa-
tions, i.e. the UNFCCC, the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the
International Maritime Organisation.
 Revenues from carbon taxes
The AGF made some broad estimates on the potential revenues stemming from
a global tax on carbon emissions. During the UNFCCC negotiations, Switzer-
land has proposed a global carbon tax on emissions from fossil fuel use at a rate
of USD 2 per tonne of CO2, with an exemption for the first 1.5 tonnes of emis-
sions per head. According to the AGF, if all energy-related CO2 emissions world-
wide were subjected to the tax, it would raise about USD 30 billion in 2020 for
every dollar of tax per tonne of emissions. If the tax were to be levied only in
“OECD+” countries, gross revenue would be about USD 10 billion for every
dollar of tax per tonne of emissions.
 Revenues from wires charge
The AGF also suggested a “wires charge” based on a small charge of electricity
generation, either on the amount of kWh produced or linked to the amount of
carbon emissions per kWh produced. Based on the International Energy
Agency’s outlook on developments in electricity generation in OECD countries,
a “wires charge” levied at a rate of USD 0.0004 per kWh (equivalent to USD 1
per tCO2) in OECD countries would raise up to USD 5 billion by 2020.
 Revenues from removal of fossil fuel subsidies/redirection of fossil fuel 
royalties
Environmentally-harmful subsidies to fossil fuel energy should be removed as
they provide incentives to continue using carbon intensive energy. According to
OECD studies, the suppression of energy subsidies would have many advanta-
ges. Not only would it save money for both governments and tax payers but it
would also shift the economy away from activities that emit CO2, promote
energy efficiency, enhance energy security and encourage the development and
15. In the aviation sector, the estimates of the available revenue exclude also flights within the European
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deployment of low-carbon technologies.16 The OECD and the IEA have also
shown in recent analysis that suppressing these subsidies in 20 emerging coun-
tries and developing countries could cut GHG emissions by 10% globally by
2050 in comparison with the business as usual scenario.17
A share of the savings from the subsidies suppression should be diverted to cli-
mate finance. Phasing-out these subsidies would nonetheless be politically diffi-
cult, and could have harmful impacts on low-income households. Therefore, a
share of the freed budget should also be reallocated to those most affected by
the measure. During the G20 summit in September 2009, the heads of State
expressed their will “to rationalize and phase out over the medium term ineffi-
cient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption”. However,
major economies have not yet implemented concrete collective actions in
response to the G20.
 Financial transaction tax
In light of the global financial crisis, a financial transactions tax (FTT), inspired
by the Tobin tax, has been proposed as a means of reducing speculative flows.
The idea is to tax all financial transactions, including trade of equities, bonds,
currencies and derivatives.18 It has been suggested that a share of revenues from
the tax would be used for climate change. However, according to the AGF
report, “the lack of political acceptability and unresolved issues of incidence on
developing countries make it difficult to implement universally.” Therefore, it is
likely that that a financial transaction tax will be “only feasible among interes-
ted countries at the national or regional level.”
2.1.2. Carbon market offsets
Carbon market offsets represent one of the international climate regime’s core
strategies for both reducing emissions in developing countries and, coupled with
a strong carbon price, delivering a significant part of climate funding. Carbon
offsetting refers to transfers of resources related to purchases of ‘credits’ from
projects that reduce GHG emissions in developing countries. By purchasing
project-based offset credits, individuals, private entities or Governments in
16. OECD, “Financing Climate Change Action, Supporting Technology Transfer and Development – Key
messages and recommendations from recent OECD work”, 2009, p. 3, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/
1/44080723.pdf
17. OECD, “The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation: Policies and Options for Global Action
Beyond 2012”, September 2009, http://www.oecd.org/document/56/0,3746,en_2649_34361_43705336_
1_1_1_1,00.html
18. Bretton Woods Project, “IMF pours cold water on monetary reform”, update 68, 20 November 2009,
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developed countries can compensate for emissions that they are unwilling or
unable to reduce domestically.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol is the
most important market instrument involving developing countries. This offset
mechanism has two main objectives. Firstly, it enables developed countries to
meet their emission reduction targets at a lower cost. Secondly, it helps develop-
ing countries achieve sustainable development by generating private investments
and encouraging the transfer of low-carbon technologies.
So far, the CDM has proven to be the greatest source of mitigation finance to
developing countries. About USD 7 billion are invested each year.19 However,
the CDM suffers from many structural shortcomings. Firstly, the bulk of invest-
ments are concentrated in a few emerging countries with China, India and Brazil
accounting for 75% of carbon revenues. Conversely, low-income countries
which are most in need of CDM revenues receive only 3%.20 Secondly, the
development of the CDM has revealed an inherent tension between its two-fold
objectives: contributing to sustainable development in developing countries and
reducing emissions in a cost-effective way in developed countries. Indeed, the
most cost-effective and successful projects (the most criticised are the HFC and
N2O projects) are also those which contribute least to sustainable development.
Thirdly, CDM is often criticized for being a UN instrument suffering from weak
governance. The prohibitive transaction costs, the lack of transparency and pre-
dictability in the board’s decision making and the delays in the approval of
methodologies and assessments of projects are significant constraints to the effi-
ciency of the regulatory framework. Finally, the environmental integrity of the
CDM itself is disputed. In order to reduce emissions, CDM projects must con-
tribute to more emission reductions than those which would have taken place
without the projects’ existence. However, this claim of additionality is difficult
to demonstrate and the risk of approving ‘business as usual’ projects is real.
The future of the CDM is uncertain as it expires with the Kyoto Protocol in
2012. Regardless of the form under which the CDM will most probably be
extended, the current design of the mechanism needs to be deeply revised. Many
ideas of differentiation between countries and project types have been put for-
ward to address the CDM’s shortcomings. The EU has been encouraging this
revision by allowing new CDM projects in LDCs only and by prohibiting the
use of credits from certain industrial gas projects in the post-2012 EU Emissions
19. Ibidem.
20. World Bank, “Generating the funding needed for mitigation and adaptation”, inWorld Development
Report 2010: Development and Climate Change, November 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
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Trading Scheme (ETS). To achieve a better geographical balance and increase
finances for the poorest countries, the revised CDM should increasingly focus
on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), while sectoral carbon market credit-
ing approaches should be phased in after 2012 for more economically advanced
developing countries.21 The development and implementation of these sectoral
carbon markets (SCMs) should allow developing countries to scale up private
investments in accordance with their climate priorities. Ultimately, these SCMs
could become multi-sectoral cap-and-trade systems in developing countries that
could be linked to wide ETS in developed countries. Currently, developing coun-
tries such as China, India and the Republic of Korea are seriously considering
implementing such market mechanisms.
The AGF estimates that increased carbon market flows could generate between
USD 30 billion and USD 50 billion annually for developing countries, but only
“when and if carbon markets are further developed and deepened”. The scale of
additional financial flows depends on several key elements of the future climate
international architecture. These include the stringency of the emissions reduc-
tion targets from developed countries and mitigation actions from developing
countries; the future carbon market design and the stringency of starting levels
for the emissions reduction paths for the period 2013-2020. In its Working Doc-
ument entitled “Scaling up international climate finance after 2012” of April
2011, the European Commission spells out a warning. It alerts that the current
mitigation pledges, the maintaining of the expected huge surplus of Assigned
Amount Units from the first Kyoto commitment and the setting of the Kyoto
Protocol target as the starting level for the emission reduction paths for the
period 2013-2020 would result in “no demand for international credits addi-
tional to what was already been enabled by the current legislation (on the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme) and in the cap-and-trade systems planned by other
developed countries.22” Without demand, the price signal would not be strin-
gent enough. In such a scenario, it is likely that public finance would need to
cover a larger share of mitigation actions, which is not feasible in the current
economic situation.
2.1.3. Private capital
It is increasingly recognised that the majority of the incremental investment cap-
ital required to tackle climate change will need to come from the private sector.23
21. Commission Staff Working Document (2011), op. cit. note 12.
22. Commission Staff Working Document (2011), op. cit. note 12.
23. B. BUCHNER, J. BROWN and J. CORFEE-Morlot, “Monitoring and tracking long-term finance to support
climate action”, OECD/IEA, May 2011, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/63/47514140.pdfFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
19
Given the state budget crisis in most developed countries, the capacity of private
investors to make the best uses of scarce capital will be most needed. Private
investments are essential for ensuring developing countries’ transition towards
a low-carbon economy. Leveraging private flows from developed countries will
be crucial for mitigation and technology transfers, but it is also important for
many investment decisions in adaptation.
Green foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries is already con-
siderable. Depending on the definition, estimates of these green FDI vary signif-
icantly. UNCTAD estimates that green FDI flows in three key low-carbon busi-
ness areas (renewables, recycling and low-carbon technology manufacturing) to
developing countries over 2003-2009 amounted to USD 149 billion (i.e. about
USD 20 billion annually). From this amount, about two-thirds came from devel-
oped countries.24 The OECD estimates that green FDI flows to developing coun-
tries in the electricity, gas and water sectors were about USD 7.6 billion per year
between 2005 and 2007, whereas FDI flows in all “environmentally-relevant”
sectors amounted to about USD 190 billion annually.25
The AGF report estimates that international private capital flows directed to
climate actions in developing countries could amount to somewhere between
USD 100 and 200 billion per year by 2020. However, there is currently no glo-
bal approach for monitoring and accounting the net benefits of these gross pri-
vate flows. Acknowledging that significant work would be required to develop
an internationally agreed approach, the AGF report provides a methodology on
how to calculate net private flows. According to this approach, up to USD 200
billion in gross private flows per year could lead to private net flows in the range
of USD 20 to 24 billion per year.
Despite the key role of the private sector in financing climate change, the AGF
report identifies several important barriers to scaling up private investment in
developing countries. These include a difficult policy environment, unattractive
business investment framework, inadequate access to finance and insufficient
risk-adjusted returns. Private investment incentives are therefore needed to
encourage the development of low-carbon technologies in developing countries.
Public instruments can address these barriers by improving the general business
investment environment, supporting risk-sharing instruments, and providing
revenue support through concessional loans, grants and guarantees.26 Carbon
24. UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2010 – Investing in a low-carbon economy”, New-York and
Geneva, 2010, p. 111, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf
25. S. S. GOLUB, C. KAUFFMANN and P. YERES, “Defining and Measuring Green FDI: An Exploratory
Review of Existing Work and Evidence”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2011/
2, OECD Investment Division, June 2011, pp. 27-28, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/8/48171454.pdf
26. Commission Staff Working Document (2011), op. cit. note 12.FINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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pricing and domestic policies also have a role to play in making low-carbon
technologies economically viable.
The AGF report considers that “multilateral development banks, the United
Nations system and bilateral agencies, other institutional institutions, public-
private risk-sharing instruments and more developed carbon markets can all
play key roles” in providing these private investment incentives. According to
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), expe-
rience with the Global Environment Facility (a multilateral financial mechanism
operating under the UNFCCC) shows that public funding dedicated to mitiga-
tion can generate private investment with a leverage factor of 7 or more.27 Fur-
thermore, the World Bank (WB) estimates that funding from the CDM can lev-
erage on average private investment by a factor of 4:6.28
2.1.4. Development bank instruments
As an important channel of climate finance to developing countries, the Multi-
lateral Development Banks (MDBs), in close cooperation with the United
Nations system, can play a significant role in increasing both public and private
finance. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
MDBs accounted for more than half (about USD 16.5 billion) of total revenue
for public climate financing in 2009 (about USD 30 billion).29 The AGF esti-
mates that for every USD 10 billion in additional resources, multilateral devel-
opment banks could deliver between USD 30 billion and USD 40 billion per year
in gross capital flows and even more by fostering private flows. The net flows
from multilateral development banks could reach USD 11 billion per year.
Alongside this leveraging role, they also have a track record in providing tech-
nical assistance as well as financial and sector expertise. Accordingly, the capac-
ity of these banks should be strengthened through additional resources over the
course of the next decade.
2.2. Who will pay and how?
As climate finance will be substantially scaled up and provided by different
sources and via different channels, an agreement on an equitable burden-sharing
27. OECD (2011), op. cit. note 10.
28. World Bank (2009), op. cit. note 21.
29. UNEP, “Bilateral Finance Institutions and Climate Change – A Mapping of 2009 Climate Financial
Flows to Developing Countries”, 2010, http://www.unep.org/publications/search/pub_details_s.asp?ID=
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at a global level will have to be found. There is a growing consensus that to be
equitable, countries’ financial contributions should respect the ‘polluter pays’
principle and be established according to their respective ‘ability to pay’, i.e.
national wealth. The ‘polluter pays’ principle engenders a responsibility for
greenhouse gas emissions. The timescale against which emissions can be meas-
ured is however difficult to determine, and a reference year will have to be deter-
mined. Until now, most emission estimates take either 1990 or 2005 as their
reference year. Regarding the ‘ability to pay’ of each country, the most common
measure of national wealth is the gross domestic product (GDP).
While LDCs should be relieved from any financial commitment, economically
more advanced developing countries should ideally contribute to climate financ-
ing. Nevertheless, the long-term financial pledge stipulated in the Cancun Agree-
ments has until now only been made by developed countries. In its 2011 Staff
working Document of April 2011, the European Commission assumes that the
group of developed countries is identical to the group of Annex 1 countries
under the Kyoto Protocol and gives estimates of these countries’ contributions
to long-term climate finance on the basis of both criteria: GHG emissions and
GDP (see table 3).30 In light of this, a key concern will be determining the share
given to each of the two criteria when calculating national contributions.
Assuming that the share allocated to emissions is larger than the GDP’s share,
the incentive to reduce emissions would be higher.
Table 3: Annex 1 countries’ contributions in % to the long-term climate finance
Source: COM SEC (2011) 487 final
Note: GHG emissions (including LULUCF), 2008; GDP in USD at market exchange rates, 2010; “other”
includes Ukraine, Belarus, Switzerland, New Zealand, Norway, Croatia and Iceland.
30. Commission Staff Working Document (2011), op. cit. note 12.
Criteria
%
GHG
100
GHG/GDP
75/25
GHG/GDP
50/50
GHG/GDP
25/75
GDP
100
United States 38 37 36 35 34
E U - 2 7 2 93 13 33 63 8
Russian Federation 11 9 7 5 3
Japan 8 9 10 11 13
C a n a d a 54444
A u s t r a l i a 44333
O t h e r 66555
Total 100 100 100 100 100FINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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2.3. What kind of money?
The Cancun Agreements state that “new and additional, predictable and ade-
quate funding […] shall be provided to developing countries”. The UNFCCC,
under its Article 4.3, already recognised that developed countries “shall provide
new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by
developing country Parties […] The implementation of these commitments shall
take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds.”
Firstly, the meaning of ‘new and additional’ funding is one of the most critical
issues in the negotiations on climate financing. Although developed countries
have pledged funds, they have not predefined a baseline against which the
financial contributions could be assessed. This is causing levels of mistrust
between developed and developing countries. Developing countries and leading
NGOs insist on the importance of climate funding being new, i.e. not money
already pledged in the past, and additional, i.e. superior to the developed-coun-
tries’ commitment to provide 0.7% of their gross national income to Official
Development Assistance (ODA). However, given current strains on domestic
budgets resulting from the economic recession, most developed countries have
an interest in upholding an elusive and ambiguous definition of additionality.
Consequently, donors have developed a variety of methods to define at which
point international public financial support can be considered additional to
existing aid funds. For the minority of those who already contribute up to 0,7%
of their GNI to ODA, it is easy to agree with this baseline. For the others, it is,
inter alia; the support above the 2009 ODA support, a specified percentage of
the rising ODA levels, or the financial support from sources not connected to
ODA.31
A clear definition of what constitutes new and additional climate finance is
needed to establish clear common rules on the monitoring reporting and verifi-
cation (MRV) of climate funding. However, given that the issue is highly con-
tentious and political, it is unlikely to be addressed in the near future. According
to most of the definitions of additionality, ODA will continue to be an impor-
tant source of funding for climate change in the short term, at least.32 There-
fore, the MRV system of ODA, if improved, could at least ensure that the
amount of money going to climate change is known, so as to determine what
31. For an explanation of climate finance additionality and the advantages and drawbacks of different
definitions and baselines, see: J. BROWN, N. BIRD and L. SCHALATEK, “Climate finance additionality:
emerging definitions and their implications”, Overseas Development Institute and Heinrich Böll Stiftung,
Climate Finance Policy Brief No. 2, June 2010, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4931.pdf; M.
STADELMANN, J. TIMMONS ROBERTS, S. HUQ, “Baseline for trust: defining ‘new and additional’ climate
funding”, IIED Briefing, June 2010, http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17080IIED.pdf
32. J. BROWN et al. (2010), op. cit. note 31.FINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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may be considered as additional. In the long-term, a workable baseline could
be to count the funds from new funding sources only, such as revenues from
taxes on international aviation and shipping or from auctioning of emission
allowances. These funds are ‘new’ by definition and are likely to be ‘additional’
to ODA.33
Secondly, the level of funding must be ‘adequate’ to ensure that global temper-
atures do not increase more than 2°C 34 and to help countries adapt to the
impacts of climate change. The commitment of developed countries to provide
USD 100 billion by 2020 to developing countries is tied to the objective of lim-
iting the increase in global temperature to 2°C (although it is estimated that
current pledges of industrialised countries to reduce emissions put the world on
a path for a global warming of 3.5°C by 2100). However, as mentioned above
(see Table 1), funding needs remain difficult to assess, hence the uncertainty over
the required levels of funding. The current top-down approach in determining
the funding needs should therefore be replaced by estimates based on national
needs as set out in the national Low-Carbon Growth Plans (LCGPs) containing
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and National Adaptation
Programmes of Action (NAPAs).35
Thirdly, developing countries insist on the ‘predictability’ of funding. It is
important that funding is known and secure over a long-term period in order to
allow national authorities to plan, scale-up and implement their action pro-
grammes. So far, a huge gap exists between the amount of money pledged by
developed countries and the amount of money actually disbursed. In April 2011,
out of the USD 30.88 billion of funds pledged to the 24 multilateral and bilateral
funds listed so far, only USD 10.6 billion have been deposited and barely USD
1.9 billion has been disbursed.36 Moreover, due to the fact that private sector
funding is inherently unpredictable, it is crucial to ensure the delivery of an
increased flow of public funding to the most vulnerable developing countries,
which are least likely to benefit from private investments. In order to improve
33. M. STADELMANN et al. (2010), op. cit. note 31.
34. Although, the COP officially decided in Cancun to keep a global temperature increase below 2°C, sig-
nificant risks are now associated with this temperature threshold. Hence, the important call from more
than 100 countries in Cancun and previously in Copenhagen to consider holding the raise in global tem-
perature to 1.5°C.
35. L. SCHALATEK, “A Matter of Principle(s)” – A normative Framework for a Global Compact on Public
Climate Finance”, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, November 2010, http://www.boell.de/ecology/economics/eco-
logical-economics-study-a-matter-of-principle-s-10723.html; N. BIRD, “A transparency agreement for
international climate finance – addressing the trust deficit”, Overseas Development Institute, March
2010, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=4798&title=transparency-agreement-international-
climate-finance-addressing-trust-deficit
36. Information available on Climate Funds Update: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/graphs-statis-
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predictability, some observers suggest increasing the number of contributing
country pledges to be delivered according to a verifiable and enforceable time-
table over successively longer periods.37
37. L. SCHALATEK (2010), op. cit. note 35; N. BIRD (2010), op. cit. note 35.25
3. ADMINISTRATING THE FUNDS
Between the mobilisation and the delivery, the funds will have to be adminis-
tered efficiently and allocated to the most effective climate actions. A mix of
both bilateral and multilateral funds will be required to manage the amount of
money that will have to be raised and delivered. In Cancun, a decision was made
to establish a new Green Climate Fund (GCF) to channel scaled-up finance to
address climate change in a more equitable and efficient manner.
The intricate network of existing bilateral and multilateral climate funds, as well
as the potential role of the new GCF will be analysed in the first part of this
section. Then, the importance of transparency and accountability in the man-
agement of climate funds will be examined in the second part.
3.1. Who will manage the funds?
3.1.1. The current climate funds architecture
Both bilateral and multilateral climate funds will be required to manage the
scaled-up funding. In the past couple of years, many new multilateral and bilat-
eral climate funds have been established in order to develop channels of interna-
tional climate financing. Contrary to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
(which requires a reduction in the fragmentation of aid), this has increased the
complexity of the funds architecture and has resulted in a lack of coordination
of international support. Moreover, it has led to high transaction costs in recip-
ient countries, where institutional capacity is often too weak to deal with the
administrative burden of different funding initiatives.38
Currently, there are 23 dedicated multilateral and bilateral climate funds (see
Table 4).39 Bilateral funds are nationally driven initiatives from single contribu-
tor countries. The largest one is the Hatoyama Initiative from Japan. Multilat-
eral climate funds are those which receive contributions from different coun-
tries, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) under the financial mech-
anism of the UNFCCC and the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) created by the
World Bank and other regional Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).
38. N. BIRD, “The Challenge of Securing European Coherence on Climate Finance”, EDC 2020, January
2011, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=5416&title=challenge-securing-european-coher-
ence-climate-finance
39. Information available on Climate Funds Update: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listingFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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Table 4: Climate funds architecture diagram
Source: Climate Funds Update, available on: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/architecture
3.1.2. The new Green Climate Fund
The decision to establish a new Green Climate Fund (GCF) was made in Can-
cun. This fund is considered by many, especially developing countries, as an
opportunity to create an efficient institution for the delivery of scaled-up climate
funding on the basis of a shared vision from developed and developing coun-
tries. A transitional Committee was commissioned by the Parties to design the
GCF and make recommendations to the next COP in Durban. However, there
are doubts on whether this new central initiative would be able to deliver ade-
quate and predictable funding in a timely manner. Much work remains to be
done before the GCF can be fully operational.
In addition to the GCF and the Transitional Committee, the Cancun Agreements
also established a Standing Committee. The latter should assist the COP in exer-
cising its functions with respect to the financial mechanism of the Convention
but its role and functions remain to be defined.FINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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a. The Green Climate Fund
The GCF will “be accountable to and function under the guidance of the Con-
ference of the Parties”. A controversial issue regarding the GCF was whether the
fund should be ‘accountable and under the guidance’ of the COP as argued by
the majority of developed countries40 or whether it should also fall ‘under the
authority’ of the COP as argued by the G77+China.41 Given that the Parties
finally agreed on ‘accountable to and under the guidance’ in the Cancun Agree-
ments, it is important to understand what ‘under the authority’ implies. In a
study in 2009, Müller42 infers an informal definition of the concept ‘under the
authority’ based on two key features, namely that the COP has the authority (i)
to select (‘hire and fire’) the members of the Board, and (ii) to approve general
rules and guidelines proposed by the Board.43 While it is unlikely that the COP
will have these prerogatives with respect to the Board of the GCF, the relation-
ship between the GCF and the COP should be defined more clearly.
The GCF will be supported by an independent Secretariat and governed by a
Board of 24 members comprising an equal number of members from developed
and developing countries.44 The Equal and balanced representation of all Parties
in the governing body of the fund is crucial for building trust. So far, developing
countries often have the feeling that they are unable to influence decisions,
which are dominated by donor concerns. In order to change the still very actual
“one dollar-one vote” system, equitable representation of all stakeholders in the
administration of multilateral funds should be applied.
One of the most contentious issues of the Fund’s structure is the role of the
World Bank. Many developing countries had opposed proposals for the World
Bank to manage the new fund, arguing that the Bank is dominated by rich and
industrialised countries, which pursue their own commercial interests. Instead,
the fund will be managed by the board, but the bank will still be involved as an
interim trustee of the fund. The role of the Bank will be subject to a review by
40. Proposal submitted by the EU for a COP decision on the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, available
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awglca12/eng/misc06a01.pdf
41. G77 and China Proposal, “Financial Mechanism for Meeting Financial Commitments under the Con-
vention”, available at: http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/g77_china_financing_1.pdf
42. B. MÜLLER, “Under the Authority of the COP?”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, November
2009, http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/comment_02_10_09.pdf
43. This informal definition of the concept ‘under the authority’ is inferred from the Bali Adaptation
Fund Decision (CMP.3/1). In this Decision, the Adaptation Fund Board is stipulated to be “under the
authority and guidance of, and fully accountable to” the CMP (Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol). By comparing this relation to that between the COP and the
Global Environmental Facility (GEF), in which the GEF is ‘accountable and under the guidance of the
COP’, Müller infers the two key features.
44. The representation of developing countries in the Board will include representatives from the United
Nations regional groupings as well as the Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) and the LDCs.FINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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all Parties after a period of three years. It is very unlikely though that its respon-
sibilities will be rescinded once its functions have been established. As trustee,
the Bank will mainly play a role of financial administrator, having no official
role in the fund’s management and policy-making. Given the important role of
the Multilateral Development Banks of the World Bank in leveraging public and
private funds, the Cancun Agreements allow the Bank to “commingle” its assets
with those of the GCF for “investment purposes”. However, the text also states
that the Bank will “administer the assets of the GCF only for the purpose of, and
in accordance with, the relevant decisions of the GCF Board”, to which it will
be entirely accountable. As rightly stated by Neil Bird et al., regarding the need
of scaled-up finance, it is crucial that the Board has confidence in the adminis-
trator of its financial assets.45
The decision reached on the internal management and administration arrange-
ments of the GCF is quite balanced. The calls made by developing countries for
an equitable governance regime have been heeded to.
b. The Transitional Committee
The GCF is to be designed by the Transitional Committee (TC), which was
entrusted with the task of making recommendations to the COP in Durban and
developing the operational documents on the basis of the terms of reference set
out in Annex III of the Cancun Agreements. The Committee is composed of 40
experts, of whom 25 are from developing countries46 and 15 from developed
countries. Having a majority representation of developing countries should help
in building trust in the future design of the GCF. The staff must be seconded
from “relevant United Nations agencies, international financial institutions, and
multilateral banks, along with the secretariat and the Global Environment Facil-
ity”. The Cancun decisions also state that “the TC meetings will be open to
observers”. These observers from the civil society can actively participate in the
meetings.47 This is important in order to ensure the legitimacy and transparency
of the TC’s work. However the TC may “at any time decide that a meeting or
part thereof be closed to observers”48.
45. N. BIRD, J. BROWN and L. SCHALATEK, “Design challenges for the Green Climate Fund”, Climate
Finance Policy Brief No. 4, Heinrich Böll Stiftung and Overseas Development Institute, January 2011,
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=5256&title=design-challenges-green-climate-fund
46. Seven members from Africa, seven members from Asia, seven members from the Group of Latin
American and Caribbean States, two members from Small Island Developing States and two members
from the Least Developed Countries.
47. UNFCCC Secretariat, “Working arrangements for the Transitional Committee for the design of Green
Climate Fund”, UNFCCC, 13 April 2011, http://unfccc.int/files/cancun_agreements/green_climate_fund/
application/pdf/tc_1_3_working_arrangements_for_the_tc_.pdf
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In developing its recommendations for the next COP in Durban, the TC will
work on the operational documents for the GCF that address several issues laid
down in Annex III of the terms of reference of the Cancun Agreements.49 It is
very unlikely that the TC will be able to tackle all these issues in time for the
Durban Conference. However, progress could be made by putting in place the
institutions that will manage the GCF (the GCF Board and the Secretariat), and
by agreeing on the role of the GCF, i.e. its objectives, scale and scope.50 The text
of the Cancun Agreements is very vague when it comes to the Fund’s role. It only
mentions that “a significant share of new multilateral funding for adaptation
should flow through the GCF”. Bird et al. rightly highlight that “this clause
contains a number of possible limitations that could be seen as to constrain the
ambition of the fund”51.
The operationalisation of the GCF will be difficult as long as contentious issues
regarding the mobilisation and the delivery of funds remain unsolved within the
negotiations. A key issue is how the fund will find adequate and predictable
resources to carry out its mandate. If the GCF wants to compete with the numer-
ous existing funds and become a central element of international climate
finance, it will have to complement and add value to existing initiatives by devel-
oping innovative financing systems in accordance with financing needs.
c. The Standing Committee
In addition, the Cancun Agreements proposed establishing “a Standing Com-
mittee (SC) under the COP to assist the COP in exercising its functions with
respect to the financial mechanism of the Convention”. These functions include
“improving coherence and coordination in the delivery of climate change
financing, rationalization of the financial mechanism, mobilization of financial
resources and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of support pro-
vided” to developing countries. This list of functions appears to be a basket
containing all the most contentious issues which will need to be dealt with later
on.52 Parties will need to further define the role and functions of the SC in line
with the execution of these issues.
49. These issues include; the legal and institutional arrangements, the Fund Board Rules of Procedure, the
financial instruments, the funding windows and the access modalities, the complementarity between the
Fund’s activities and the other funds and institutions, the role of the Secretariat, the independent evalua-
tion of the Fund’s performance, the establishment of mechanisms to ensure environmental and social safe-
guards, fiduciary standards and financial accountability, and the set up of mechanisms to ensure expert
and technical advice as well as stakeholder input and participation.
50. A. BALLESTEROS, “The Road to the Green Climate Fund”, World Resources Institute, 14 February
2011, http://www.wri.org/stories/2011/02/road-green-climate-fund
51. N. BIRD et al. (2011), op. cit. note 45.
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Apart from the assistance in the mobilisation of funds and MRV, another impor-
tant issue the SC will have to address is how the new GCF will interact with the
intricate network of existing bilateral and multilateral funds. In order to address
this issue, the SC will have to improve the “coherence and coordination” in the
delivery between the climate funds, while also dealing with the “rationalisation
of the financial mechanism”. In Cancun, a consortium of 215 civil society
organisations called for a global climate fund functioning as a ‘one-stop shop’
that would replace the current ‘spaghetti bowl’ of different channels. This solu-
tion would surely reduce both complexity and transaction costs for developing
countries. However, it is very unlikely that the GCF will replace existing initia-
tives. Therefore, a pragmatic approach has to be followed. First, a new hierar-
chy is required. This hierarchy should make the GCF the largest existing fund
inside (and eventually outside) the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC. Sec-
ond, an appropriate division of labour amongst climate funds, which would
increase complementarity and reduce transaction costs, should be promoted.
This division of labour implies coordination among funds in areas such as the
geographical distribution of funding, the most appropriate use of multiple
sources of funding and the balancing of funds between mitigation and adapta-
tion.
3.2. How should the funds be administrated?
In order to administrate the climate financing more efficiently, more transpar-
ency will be required. Transparency requires information on fund development
from the mobilization stage to delivery. This information must be publicly avail-
able, accurate and timely.
Transparency – which implies measuring, monitoring and verifying (MRV) cli-
mate financing – is paramount for many reasons. Not only does it build trust
between developed and developing countries by showing that the money
pledged is actually delivered53, but it also facilitates coordination between cli-
mate funds and avoids duplications. Furthermore, it enables all interested par-
ties to assess the scale and type of support provided, to identify possible difficul-
ties in specific sectors or regions and to hold governments and climate finance
funds accountable for their actions.
53. K. STATSIO and R. MONCEL, “Transparency of Climate Finance: Results from Cancun and Next
Steps”, World Resources Institute, 3 April 2011, http://www.wri.org/stories/2011/04/transparency-cli-
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Tracking climate finance is very challenging, as the flows come from different
sources (public and private, national and international), and are channeled via
a multitude of different bilateral and multilateral funds, as well as having differ-
ent aims (mitigation, adaptation or capacity-building).54 Currently, the different
methods used by countries to measure, report and verify (MRV) climate financ-
ing provide limited and incomplete information. A clear and comprehensive
framework for MRV international climate financing must therefore be devel-
oped.
Some progress was registered in the Cancun decisions. Reporting by developed
countries should be enhanced for long-term financing. This entails the develop-
ment of “common reporting formats” and “methodologies for finance”, ensur-
ing that the “information provided is complete, comparable, transparent and
accurate.” Developing a comprehensive framework for MRV should be built on
existing reporting mechanisms such as the OECD – Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) system for measuring public climate finance to developing
countries. Such a framework should provide information on both the aid deliv-
ered by developed countries and received by developing countries. Further meth-
odological work is needed on how to measure and assess the effectiveness of
public climate flows, especially with regards to adaptation given its intricate
linkages with development.55 The OECD is currently working on this issue.
Furthermore, the Cancun Agreements aimed to establish a registry which will
help developing countries to match their nationally appropriate mitigation
actions (NAMAs) with international financial support.
With regard to fast-start finance, developed countries are required to annually
report their financial commitments up until 2012. However, there is no indica-
tion on the contents or form of such reporting.56 Currently, countries are report-
ing information which is neither comprehensive nor comparable.57 This lack of
transparency from developed countries could jeopardise the negotiations
towards a global climate agreement. Developing countries are awaiting progress
with fast-start financing before going any further.58
Although the important role of private finances has been acknowledged, there
are no established monitoring tools for climate-related private financing.
54. OCDE (2011), op. cit. note 10.
55. Ibidem.
56. K. STATSIO and R. MONCEL (2011), op. cit. note 53.
57. The gaps in information are revealed in the fast-start table of the World Resources Institute, available
on: http://www.wri.org/publication/summary-of-developed-country-fast-start-climate-finance-pledges
58. C. POLYCARP, “Have countries delivered on Fast-Start Climate Finance?”, World Resources Institute,
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According to the OECD, the system of MRV could be extended to include some
climate-related private financial flows, such as those related to CDM. However,
methods for measuring the potentially important role of green foreign direct
investment (FDI) are much needed. Relevant international organisations such as
the OECD and the UNCTAD are working on it, “with a view to promoting a
better understanding of the contribution FDI can make to help the shift to a low-
carbon economy and the role policies may play in the greening of FDI”59.
In brief, as long as there is no clear definition of what counts as “climate
finance” (especially private climate finance), it will be difficult to track it.
59. K. STATSIO and R. MONCEL (2011), op. cit. note 53.33
4. DELIVERING THE FUNDS
So far, little focus has been put on the delivery of funds and the Cancun Agree-
ments shed little light on the subject. Yet, this is fundamental when assessing the
effectiveness, efficiency and fairness of climate finance.
4.1. Who should be responsible for the funds 
delivery?
As rightly stated by Neil Bird et al. (2011), one of the main lessons to be drawn
from the experience of development aid finance is the recognition that national
ownership over the development process is paramount.60 A shift of responsibil-
ity in the disbursement of multilateral climate financing from the current donor
dominated approach to a recipient country-led approach should be made. In
conformity with the subsidiarity principle, funding decisions should be made at
the lowest efficient level. As such, recipient countries should – as much as pos-
sible – exercise leadership over their climate change policies, and determine their
funding needs according to their national strategies. This requires an important
role for governments in developing countries in order to overcome weak insti-
tutional capacity through the establishment of national governance structures
for planning, implementing and monitoring financial flows. An early financial
support must therefore be allocated to build up adequate institutional, technical
or managerial capacity so that recipient countries can absorb and use new finan-
cial flows effectively. It is increasingly recognised that unless climate funds are
provided in ways that strengthen national governance systems and accountabil-
ity mechanisms, the scaling-up of these funds might “undermine years of efforts
promoting national ownership and accountability.”61
While the Cancun Agreements are silent about national ownership, its terms of
reference (Annex 3) do mention ‘direct access’ to funding, which is considered
as a means to increase national ownership and decrease transaction costs. Direct
access entails that “the recipient countries can access financial resources directly
from the fund, or can assign an implementing entity of their choosing”.62 Tra-
60. N. BIRD et al. (2011), op. cit. note 45.
61. Global Climate Change Alliance, “GCCA Support Facility”, Information note on the GCCA events of
28 February to 4 March 2001, Port Vila, Vanuatu, http://www.gcca.eu/usr/GCCA-Pacific---Information-
note-on-the-GCCA-events.pdf.
62. J. BROWN, N. BIRD and L. SCHALATEK, “Direct Access to the Adaptation Fund: realising the potential
of National Implementing Entities”, Heinrich Böll Stiftung and Overseas Development Institute, Climate
Finance Policy Brief No. 3, November 2010, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/rome2007/docs/
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ditionally, funds are channelled via a bilateral or multilateral organisation such
as the World Bank or UNDP, acting as an implementing agency of the funds
administrator.63 Direct access thus allows the beneficiary countries to perform
the functions of developing, approving and monitoring projects, without having
to rely on the assistance of intermediary entities. It is the Kyoto Protocol Adap-
tation Fund that has developed direct access through the accreditation of
National Implementing Entities (NIEs).64 NIEs directly receive the Adaptation
Fund’s funding that will be used for in-country adaptation projects and pro-
grammes. However, these NIEs are not easy to establish. So far, the Adaptation
Fund Board has accredited only four of the numerous NIE applications.65
Despite the difficult development of NIEs, direct access has raised great interest
among the International Community.
4.2. How should the funds be allocated?
The questions related to the way funds should be allocated can be asked with
respect to several issues; (i) the allocation between countries, (ii) the allocation
between mitigation and adaptation and, (iii) the allocation of funds in a timely
manner. Each of them will be respectively addressed in the following section.
Firstly, the GCF will surely encounter difficulties when trying to allocate climate
change funding in an equitable manner. The Cancun Agreements state that fund-
ing for the most vulnerable countries, such as the LDCs, SIDS and Africa will be
prioritised. However, in light of the lack of institutional, human and technical
capacity, creating the means for these countries to access the funding will be a
major challenge. The eligibility for receiving funds should be decided on the
basis of internationally agreed vulnerability indicators, instead of the current
‘first mover’ advantage that prevails in most of the funds. The funds allocation
should reflect the needs of the beneficiary regions and countries while simulta-
neously encompassing social and economic realities.
In any case, aspiring to a more equitable distribution of funds is likely to create
ongoing tension amongst private investors, who are inclined to seek profitability
and cost-effectiveness. The concentration of CDM projects in specific regions
shows that ‘flexible’ instruments do not lead to equitable distribution. This ten-
sion has already appeared in the distribution of fast-start finance, impeding
international climate negotiations as a result. While fast-start finance was spe-
63. L. SCHALATEK (2010), op. cit. note 35, p. 47.
64. The Adaptation Fund also allows Parties, seeking financial resources, to submit proposals using the
services of Multilateral Implementing Entities (MIEs).
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cifically intended for LDCs, SIDS and Africa, it appears that rich countries are
trying to sneak in their existing funding to emerging economies as part of their
fast-start finance package. For instance, the US has listed about $26 million to
India as part of their fast-start finance pledges.66 Yet, the BASIC countries –
Brazil, South Africa, India and China – have voluntarily declared that they are
not candidates for fast-start finance.
Secondly, the Cancun Agreements require a “balanced allocation between adap-
tation and mitigation.” However, there is yet to be found a consensus on what
“balanced allocation” actually means. The current allocation of funds between
mitigation and adaptation is considerably unbalanced. To date, only 13,9% of
public climate finance has been allocated to adaptation.67 The GCF should
address this adaptation gap. According to the Cancun Agreements, “a signifi-
cant share of new multilateral funding for adaptation should flow through the
Green Climate Fund”. It is the TC which will be charged with providing clarity
on what “balanced” signifies. In the meantime, developed countries should try
to ensure a balanced allocation close to 50% for each adaptation and mitiga-
tion.
Finally, in their proposal for a future financial framework, developing countries
insist on the availability of resources in a timely manner.68 In order to ensure the
successful implementation of national policy actions, funding must be allocated
when required. Regarding previous development aid experiences, the timeliness
of funding has always represented quite a challenge. Liane Schalatek (2010)69
proposes to take the amount of disbursed funds within a relatively short period
of time as performance indicators and to calculate the reduction of the current
wide gap between pledged and disbursed funds70 during that same period. Then,
a public “naming and shaming” of contributing countries with unfulfilled
pledges could help in accelerating the flow of climate funds. Two significant
initiatives are already attempting to do this with regard to fast-start finance.71
However, this strategy is currently difficult to implement due to the lack of avail-
able data in the reporting on the delivery of climate finance from developed
66. P. JEBARAJ, “Fast-start finance for climate change has not even passed double digit”, The Hindu, New
Delhi, 27 February 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1495744.ece
67. Information available on Climate Funds Update website: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/graphs-
statistics/areas-of-focus
68. G77 and China Proposal, op. cit. note 41, p. 2.
69. L. SCHALATEK (2010), op. cit., pp. 45-46.
70. Information available on Climate Funds Update website: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/graphs-
statistics/pledged-deposited-disbursed
71. For a state of play of fast-start climate finance, see: http://www.faststartfinance.org/home, Fast Start
Finance is a Netherlands-led initiative, developed with support from other countries and in consultation
with the UNFCCC, UNEP, UNDP and the WB monitoring efforts; http://www.wri.org/publication/sum-
mary-of-developed-country-fast-start-climate-finance-pledges, the civil society monitoring efforts of the
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countries. While the enhanced reporting provisions of the Cancun Agreements
will be essential “for successful tracking of developed country climate financial
flows”, their implementation “will not be ready in time to provide guidance for
reporting on the short-term, fast-start finance.”72 Therefore, despite clear
pledges from developed countries, the delivery of funds remains slow and uncer-
tain so far.
4.3. What finance modality should be used for 
mitigation and adaptation?
Two main modalities can be used to finance climate change, namely grants and/
or concessional loans. There is a general agreement that funding should be
‘appropriate’, meaning that the finance modalities used to deliver resources
should not place any additional burdens on the recipient country.
It is widely acknowledged that adaptation should be financed only through pub-
lic grants, not by repayable loans (even under favourable conditions). Adapta-
tion finance must not be viewed as ‘aid’, but rather as a compensation for the
damages caused by climate change in developing countries due to the excess of
carbon emissions from developed countries. In practice, necessary adaptation
investments could be constrained if recipient countries have to finance them
through loans.
As for mitigation, the choice between loan and grant should be assessed on a
case by case basis. In poor countries, already heavily indebted, it is clear that
mitigation finance should be predominantly provided through grants. Conces-
sional loans could often come at the expense of reductions in social public
expenditures, affecting vulnerable populations who are already living in pov-
erty. One of the biggest challenges will therefore be raising enough funds so as
to provide the necessary grant financing. Loans will undoubtedly also have a key
role to play in financing climate change, especially to leverage private funds.
Many developing countries are inclined to believe that loan finance is acceptable
under certain national conditions, depending on the sector and the project/pro-
gramme financed.73 It is important to underline that climate finance in the form
of loans is often conducted according to highly concessional terms.74
72. A. BALLESTEROS et al. (2011), op. cit. note 11.
73. N. BIRD and J. BROWN (2010), op. cit. note 3.
74. According to the OECD definition, “the concessionality is achieved either through interest rates
below those available on the market or by grace periods, or a combination of these.”37
5. THE EU’S CONTRIBUTION TO CLIMATE 
FUNDING
The EU and its Member States have committed to providing new and additional
finance for tackling climate change in the short and long term. As the world’s
leading provider of ODA and a frontrunner in the provision of climate finance,
the EU must take the lead in ensuring the mobilisation, administration and
delivery of climate financing in the most efficient, consistent and transparent
manner possible.
While the EU fast-start finance contribution will be based on existing initiatives,
the long-term financing process is still uncertain. Both the EU’s contribution to
long-term financing, and the management of this long-term financing remain
unknown. As climate change is an area of shared competences between the EU
and the Member States, a coherent and credible European approach on interna-
tional climate financing is and will be difficult to develop. Indeed, the first chal-
lenge for the EU remains in defining the added-value of the European approach
to the existing national and international initiatives.75
The following section will analyse how the EU is meeting its fast-start finance
pledge and how it is planning to deliver scaled-up climate finance from 2013 to
2020 before examining the lessons learned from the EU’s experience so far. The
trajectory of scaled-up climate finance will depend largely on the fast-start
finance experience.
5.1. EU fast-start finance up to 2012
A clear and consistent reporting framework is vital for the long-term success of
global climate financing and the EU has a central role to play towards achieving
this. Despite the difficulties to gathering data from 27 Member States, the EU
has made relevant efforts to ensure the reporting of the commitments of the
Member States and the European Commission on fast-start finance. The EU’s
first annual report on fast-start finance in 201076 as well as the pro-active EU
communications in Cancun and before demonstrate the EU’s willingness to send
the right message to developing countries, i.e. the EU and its Member States are
75. N. BIRD and J. BROWN (2010), op. cit. note 3.
76. Council of the European Union, “EU Fast Start finance Report for Cancun”, 6 December 2010, http:/
/register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st15; Council of the European Union, “Addendum to note: EU
Fast Start finance Report for Cancun”, 11 November 2010, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/
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serious about meeting their pledges in a transparent, open and cooperative man-
ner.
Although the reporting efforts of the EU cannot be denied and are the most
comprehensive relative to other developed countries, the execution of these
efforts is still insufficient.77 However, 2010 being the first year of the fast start
finance period, it would have been unrealistic to expect much better. In analys-
ing the shortcomings of this first year experience, lessons can be learnt so as to
improve future reports in the short term and the mobilisation, administration
and delivery of funds in the long term. The trajectory of scaled-up climate
finance will largely depend on the fast-start finance experience.
5.1.1. Mobilising EU fast-start finance
Of the US $ 30 billion that the developed countries have committed to provide
for the period 2010-2012 as fast-start financing for developing countries, the EU
and its 27 Member States have pledged EUR 7.2 billion, or EUR 2.4 billion
annually, as a single global contribution. Ensuring the EU raises these funds is
crucial for building trust with developing countries, reinstating its role in global
climate negotiations and paving the way towards larger amounts of long-term
climate funds.
Despite hard economic times and significant budgetary constraints, all 27 Mem-
ber States and the Commission have made funding commitments for the fast-
start finance period. These commitments amount to EUR 7.213 billion for
2010-2012, which slightly exceeds the initially pledged EUR 7.2 billion.
In the EU’s first official annual report on fast-start finance, the Ministers of
Finance have reaffirmed the mobilisation of EUR 2.35 billion of fast start
finance for 2010. Four Member States reported a zero contribution for 2010 but
they did not change their contribution for the fast-start period and should meet
the later in the course of 2011 and 2012. The national contributions are not
based on a distribution key but are voluntary pledges. The voluntary character
of these commitments is the result of a concession made to some Eastern Euro-
pean Member States, which feared an additional financial burden on their econ-
omies. To show the actual contribution of each Member States to fast-start
finance, the commitments of the 27 countries plus the European Commission
should be set up separately in the EU’s official report. Yet, the 2010 report only
77. L. SCHALATEK, “B+ for Effort, C- for Execution – The EU’s Fast Start Finance Report”, Climate
Equity, 30 November 2010, http://climatequity.org/2010/11/30/b-for-effort-c-for-execution-the-eus-fast-
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provides EU-wide figures or a very detailed annexed list of more than 50 pages
containing the several projects financed by Member States and the Commission
along with their funding contributions.78
The main pitfall of the EU fast start finance report lies in the absence of an EU-
wide baseline against which “new and additional” funds can be counted. While
the EU is on track to meet its fast-start finance commitment, a significant share
of the funds is simply redirected basic development aid, or repackaged commit-
ments already made in the past. Member States have interpreted and defined the
principle of “additionality” in accordance with their respective contributions.
For instance, although the UK has pledged by far the biggest contribution (about
EUR2.4 billion over the period 2010-12), all the money is expected to come
from its previous commitment to reach an ODA contribution of 0.7% of GNI
by 2013. Germany has committed about half the amount of money pledged by
the UK. However, the funds which exceed Germany’s 2009 baseline for climate
financing as well as the country’s share from auctioning in the EU ETS are con-
sidered to be additional money. The Dutch, the Danes and the Swedish, which
already exceed the 0.7% of GNI on ODA, are in favour of the 0.7% of GNI
baseline, which is preferred by developing countries. However, this definition
cannot guarantee the additionnality of funds for these countries as they can
simply recycle their existing ODA commitments in new and additional climate
funding. In response to this multitude of ‘additionality’ definitions, the EU has
truthfully recognised that a substantial part of EU fast-start finance will be
implemented through existing initiatives and that ODA will continue to play a
role in climate financing. This is mainly due to the increasing integration of
climate actions in broader development strategies. In order to avoid damaging
trust with developing countries, the EU has also committed itself to ensuring
that “fast start funding and other climate finance neither undermines nor jeop-
ardises the fight against poverty and continued progress towards the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs).”79
5.1.2. Administrating EU fast-start finance
Climate change being an area of shared competency, Member States can choose
whether they administrate their climate financial contributions unilaterally or
together via the EU.80 In order to rapidly deploy the fast-start funding, the EU
and its Member States currently use existing bilateral and multilateral delivery
78. Individual country commitments can therefore be calculated in an unconvenient manner by adding up
the contributions of all projects financed by a Member State.
79. Council of the European Union (2010), “EU Fast Start finance Report for Cancun”, op. cit. note 76
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channels.81 Out of the EU fast start finance for 2010, 44,7% of the funds will
be implemented through bilateral channels, especially by member states’ devel-
opment cooperation programmes, and 55,2% through multilateral channels of
international and regional institutions. Regarding the multilateral channels,
more than one third of the EUR 2.35 billion mobilised for 2010 will be delivered
through the World Bank funds. The rest of the funding is also being channelled
though the UNFCCC, the UN and other multilateral and bilateral instruments.
N. Bird and J. Brown (2010)82 examine several European initiatives which high-
light the different approaches towards climate finance, limiting the overall
coherence of the European response. Among these European initiatives, the two
existing European Commission initiatives83 as well as two significant Member
States initiatives are summarised as follows:
• The Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA): This European Commission
initiative has been created as the “EU’s answer to the development dimension
of climate change”84. The objective is to establish an alliance between the EU
and poor developing countries that are most affected by climate change.
Operational since 2008, the GCCA has so far failed to act as a real ‘clearing
house’ for Member States’ support to developing countries. Only two Euro-
pean countries, namely Sweden and the Czech Republic, have given modest
support. This shows that alternative channels are clearly favoured by Mem-
ber States over an EU coordinated approach. Moreover, donor funding is
classified as ODA and there is very little ownership among Member States
and beneficiary countries. Therefore, if Member States agree to channel part
of their climate funding through the fund, a more transparent governance
structure will have to be adopted.
• The Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF): It
can best be defined as a public-private partnership designed to attract funds
with high capital risk from the private sector, managed by the European
Investment Bank Group. The objective is to develop energy efficiency and
renewable energy projects in developing countries. Contrary to the GCCA,
the approach is to attract private funds in order to invest in mitigation tech-
nologies in developing countries. Endorsed by the European Commission in
2006, it took some time before the fund finally became operational in
November 2008. The mix of public and private funds makes the assessment
81. Council of the European Union (2010), “EU Fast Start finance Report for Cancun”, op. cit. note 76.
82. N. BIRD and J. BROWN (2010), op. cit. note 3; N. BIRD (2011), op. cit. note 38.
83. N. Bird and J. Brown examine a third European Commission initiative which has not been taken for-
ward, called the Global Climate Financing Mechanism. Due to the large resistance it met from Member
States and other reasons, it is unlikely that this approach will resurface.
84. European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document: Implementation of the Global Cli-
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of additionality very difficult to conduct. Should the fund be able to leverage
sufficient private finance, this innovative approach could mobilise finance of
up to EUR 1 billion. However, whether this significant figure will be reached
will depend on market conditions being able to leverage private finance,
which currently are not proving to be all that promising.
• The International Climate Fund (ICF) (formerly the Environmental Trans-
formation Fund – International window (ETF-IW)): This fund is a UK initi-
ative, which aims to support development and poverty reduction through
environmental protection, and helps poor countries tackle climate change.
As the ICF should account for 7.5 per cent of UK ODA by the end of the
Spending Review period 2014-15, it is no wonder that the UK’s contribution
to fast-start funding is part of the rising ODA budget. Every fund of the ICF
has always been allocated to three multilateral funds: the World Bank’s Cli-
mate Investment Funds, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
and the Congo Basin Forest Fund. By helping capitalise upon the World
Bank-administered funds, the UK has clearly demonstrated its lack of inter-
est in pursuing an approach led by the European Commission.
• The International Climate Initiative (ICI): This German innovative initiative
provides financial support to international projects supporting climate
change mitigation, adaptation and biodiversity. The ICI mobilises its funds
from the EU ETS auction revenues. In 2008, the German Government
started to auction 8.8% of its allowable emission permits to businesses. Of
all the revenue earned, EUR 120 million has been allocated yearly to the ICI
for developing countries and countries in transition. This innovative source
of funding is additional to ODA contributions (though it is not sure whether
it will be additional to ODA commitments). Moreover, the initiative has
demonstrated its ability to deliver climate finance in a timely manner while
respecting national ownership over allocation and disbursement of funds in
developing countries.
According to N. Bird, the German initiative is a model of efficiency that other
Member States could consider following as they will have to decide how to
spend their new auction revenues from 2012. However, some Member States
initiatives, such as the UK’s, are pursuing their own national interests “at the
expense of a European Commission-coordinated approach.” Multilateral
approaches allow economies of scale, better coordination and less fragmenta-
tion, therefore reducing the burden to beneficiary countries. However, they also
lead to a slower pace of action, as it has been the case with both the GCCA and
the World Bank-administrated funds.85
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In his analysis of these different European initiatives, N. Bird points out a vari-
ety of approaches towards raising public finance. In the short term, it will be
difficult to ensure European coherence on climate financing with such a frag-
mentation in funding initiatives. This will require coordination and coherence
through improved MRV in order to avoid inefficiency, inadequacy and duplica-
tion.
5.1.3. Delivering EU fast-start finance
EU Member States have committed themselves under the Rome and Paris Dec-
laration on Aid Effectiveness to enhance national ownership of developing
countries over financial support, especially via direct access to funding. How-
ever, it appears that, apart from a few efforts, the EU and its Member States are
not yet ready to break with the traditional donor-driven approach to climate
financing, both via existing delivery channels and new climate finance initia-
tives.86 For instance, budget support (i.e. the transfer of funds directly to the
recipient country’s consolidated fund, thus avoiding additional administrative
burdens) is supposed to be the preferred aid modality of the GCCA. However,
of the twelve countries where initial support projects have been identified, only
four of them will have funding channelled through budget support modalities.87
With regard to the geographic allocation of funds, the requirement of the Can-
cun Agreements to prioritise fast-start finance for the LDCs, the SIDSs and
Africa has to a great extent not been respected. When one looks at the annex of
the EU’s fast start finance report containing the list of the different projects
funded by the Member States and the EC, slightly less than one third of the EU’s
fast start finance in 2010 has been allocated to China and Brazil only. Yet, the
voluntary statement of the BASICs specifies that they do not want to be candi-
date countries for fast start funding.
Furthermore, the allocation between mitigation and adaptation is not really
what we could consider “balanced” as required by the Cancun Agreements.
Adaptation received around one third of the EU’s 2010 fast start funding
(35,9%). In contrast, mitigation received 45,6% of the EU’s 2010 climate con-
tribution, plus 16% allocated to REDD+ (mitigation via forest protection). The
remaining 2,5% has not been allocated. However, when this is compared to the
high historical global percentage going to mitigation (more than 85%), it shows
that the EU contributors are increasingly focused on measures concerning adap-
tation.
86. L. SCHALATEK (2010), op. cit. note 77.
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Finally, less than half of the EU’s 2010 funding (47,9%) came in the form of
grants. These grants have mainly financed adaptation projects (not all of them
though), leaving a small percentage to finance mitigation projects. The
remaining 52,7% of 2010 fast-start finance came in the form of loans, equities
and other means of funding. Most of these EU loans were often made on the
basis of highly concessional terms, including a major grant element of up to
75%.88
5.2. EU long-term finance
The European Commission in a Staff Working Document of April 2011 called
“scaling-up international climate finance after 2012” confirms the AGF report’s
conclusion that mobilising USD 100 billion per year by 2020 will be “challeng-
ing but feasible”.89 It has been explained above that the burden sharing of the
USD 100 billion amongst developed countries could depend on the share given
to two criteria; the responsibility for GHG emissions and the ability to pay
(GDP). Accordingly, the EU’s contribution would be about one third of long-
term financing if both criteria were given equal weight (see table 3 above).
On the basis of the AGF report, the Commission states that the mobilisation of
the USD 100 billion per year by 2020 will require a mix of public finance, car-
bon market finance and private finance. Development bank instruments would
also play a role in leveraging some of these sources.
The EU has already established many of the public sources related to carbon
pricing analysed in the AGF report, especially those related to the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS). These sources will play an increasingly important role in
financing climate change. However, the rigorous budgetary constraints in most
Member States stipulate that the revenues of these sources will be subjected to
competing uses. The most important source of innovative finance in the EU will
be revenues stemming from the auctioning of allowances under the EU ETS. The
Commission estimates that these revenues could amount to EUR 20 billion per
year by 2020, of which Member States should use at least half for domestic and
international climate change actions. From 2012, emissions coming from avia-
tion will be included in the EU ETS. The ETS directive states90 that the revenues
from the 15% of the allowances to be auctioned should be used to tackle climate
change domestically and internationally. This could amount to about EUR 600
88. European Commission, “EU Climate financing aid – clarification”, 2 December 2010, http://
ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2010120201_en.htm
89. Commission Staff Working Document (2011), op. cit. note 12.
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million per year.91 Moreover, carbon taxes have already been or are planned to
be established in several Member States. However, the revenues from these taxes
are generally used for other purposes in the budget. At the global level, the Com-
mission does not believe that the proposal to auction a share of Assigned
Amount Units (AAUs) will constitute a relevant source of revenues. Conversely,
taxes on international aviation and maritime transport and a tax on financial
transactions could have a significant revenue-raising potential. However, due to
concerns related to competitiveness, the revenues from these sources would pref-
erably require global agreements, which will not be easy to achieve.
In order to deliver climate finance at the required scale, the carbon market, with
a robust carbon price, is expected to play an indispensable role. The CDM has
so far been the main source of climate finance for developing countries, to a
great extent due to the EU. However, the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012 and
the numerous issues surrounding the adoption of a new global climate agree-
ment are expected to create no demand for international offset credits additional
to what was already foreseen by the current cap-and-trade legislations of the EU
and other developed countries for the period post-2012. Despite this situation,
the Commission’s strategy to take advantage of the low-carbon investment
opportunities in developing countries offered by the carbon market is two-fold.
On the one hand, the CDM should be urgently reformed globally and mainly
focused on LDCs. The EU has already reviewed its ETS legislation accordingly.
Not only the use of credits which come from some industrial gas projects will be
prohibited from 2012 onward but, in the absence of an ambitious international
climate agreement, new CDM projects will be allowed in LDCs only as of 2013.
Therefore, CDM credits will receive continued recognition in the EU ETS even
in the absence of a global climate agreement or a second commitment period
under the Kyoto Protocol. Under this current EU legislation, carbon offsets
could generate up to EUR 3 billion of financial flows to developing countries per
year in the period 2013-202092 (without counting additional flows generated by
investments underlying CDM projects).93 On the other hand, the Commission
requires “a step-wise move” towards new and more ambitious sectoral carbon
market mechanisms, especially in economically more advanced countries.94 In
order to do so, the revised Directive provides the opportunity to conclude non-
binding arrangements with third countries in order to allow credits from these
markets to be recognised for use in the EU ETS.
91. Assuming a carbon price of EUR 20 per tonne of CO2.
92. Assuming the current price for CDM credits of about EUR 13 per tonne of CO2.
93. Commission Staff Working Document (2011), op. cit. note 12.
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As analysed in section 2, the European Commission considers that private
finance will have a key role in scaling up international climate finance and that
development bank instruments can play a significant role in widening the
sources of and access to climate finance. In 2010, the European Investment Bank
(EIB) raised EUR 2 billion for climate action projects in third countries.95
Considering the increasing demand for climate finance in developing countries,
the adoption of the post-2013 EU multiannual financial framework should be
the occasion for the EU to scale-up its budget from 2013 so as to complement
the future Member States’ contributions. The Commission proposed to raise the
share of climate-related spending to at least 20% of the whole EU budget, i.e. at
least EUR 1,000 billion for the period 2014-2020. This represents more than
three times the current amount. Under the EU budget for the period 2007-2013,
the funding of climate-related actions in developing countries amounts to about
EUR 400 million per year. Decisions will have to be taken on the instruments in
the EU budget to administrate and deliver climate finance to developing coun-
tries. The EU should also consider “whether and to what extent EU support to
the GCF should best be channelled through the EU budget or come directly from
Member States’ budgets.”96
5.3. Lessons from the EU experience so far
In light of the fact that the amount of EU contribution to long-term public cli-
mate finance is not yet determined, how exactly these funds will be adminis-
trated cannot yet be analysed, let alone how they will be disbursed. However,
the lessons learned from fast-start finance will be essential not only when scaling
up financial flows but also to prepare an efficient administration and delivery of
these flows.
First, a common reporting framework with clear rules on monitoring, reporting
and verification of EU climate finance is central. The remaining shortcomings
identified in this respect during the fast-start period will need to be addressed
for the post 2012 period. The EU has to take the lead and show the right exam-
ple by providing reports with complete information in the most clear and con-
sistent way possible.
Second, fast start finance has not been delivered fast enough as of yet. The funds
are being distributed too slowly, undermining the much-needed trust with devel-
95. Ibidem.
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oping countries as a result. Yet, it has been highlighted that for successful imple-
mentation of national climate actions in developing countries, the availability of
funds in a timely manner is crucial.
Third, the EU should increase ownership and direct access of developing coun-
tries in the delivery of funds. This implies funds to equip developing countries
with the capacity to manage an increase in flows in an accountable manner and
to determine their funding needs in accordance with their national strategies.
Finally, the vast array of European initiatives to finance climate change during
the fast start period has shown different degrees of efficiency in the mobilisation,
administration and delivery of climate finance. It appears that Member States’
initiatives, particularly the German ICI, have so far delivered more tangible
results than the ones initiated by the European Commission.97 This German
initiative could influence other Member States to adopt a similar model, espe-
cially now that revenues stemming from auctioning will become increasingly
important. While this would be at the expense of the development of an EU
approach, the first challenge to address is to define what the added-value of an
EU-approach is.98 This is far from being clear. A common approach has the
advantage of offering the possibility of greater scale and decreasing the admin-
istrative burden on beneficiary countries by reducing fragmentation. However,
this comes at the expense of delayed delivery, as the experience with the GCCA
has shown. Furthermore, in light of the preference of some Member States –
such as the UK – for channelling funds according to their own priorities, the
question is whether there is room for further collective actions among Member
States in order to develop a European strategy, such as the GCCA, in the long-
term. This question is even more pressing now that the new GCF will increase
the number of initiatives, leaving even more choice to Member States. Moreover,
the predominance of the World Bank’s instruments in the first year of fast start
finance somewhat decreases the likelihood of establishing a GCF or an EU ini-
tiative channelling a significant portion of climate finance. All these lessons may
prove helpful when seeking to improve the architectural design of international
climate finance.
97. N. BIRD and J. BROWN (2010), op. cit. note 3.
98. Ibidem.47
CONCLUSION
The mobilisation, administration and delivery of climate financing in an equita-
ble, effective and efficient manner is one of the most important challenges in our
global effort to address both adaptation and mitigation in developing countries.
Although progress has been achieved on support for climate action in Cancun,
critical issues remain, especially regarding the mobilisation and delivery of
funds.
In the absence of a credible financial framework, the risk remains that actions
to tackle climate change will be insufficient, inefficient, inadequate and delayed.
The global costs would thereby increase and the path towards a low-carbon
economy would be jeopardized.
Mobilising climate funding
The commitment from developed countries to mobilise USD 30 billion for the
fast start period 2010-2012 and USD 100 billion per year by 2020 already rep-
resents a significant step forward. However, long-term financing remains to be
mobilised. The AGF report concluded that going from the current mobilisation
of USD 10 billion per year to USD 100 billion by 2020 is feasible, but represent
an enormous challenge. Given the tightening of many Government budgets
coming out of the economic recession, new and additional sources of funds must
be identified. It will require a mix of new public financing instruments, carbon
market finance and private finance, as well as development bank instruments to
leverage some of these sources. Moreover, it is important to highlight that the
scaling-up of these sources will have to take place in a context of ambitious
emissions reduction targets and progress towards an ambitious, comprehensive
and legally-binding international agreement on climate change.
Public sources will be important for financing adaptation and, in the next few
years, for supporting developing countries in their transition through the provi-
sion of capacity building, technical assistance and pilot actions. Furthermore,
public funding will be required to leverage private investment and to finance
mitigation actions in areas the private sector is likely to neglect. Among the
innovative sources of public finance set out in the AGF report, some of them
deserve particular attention for their revenue-raising potential. The most evident
is the revenue from auctioning of emission allowances in domestic emission
trading schemes. These schemes are already in operation or under consideration
in many developed countries. In the EU, the auction revenues under the EU ETSFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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will be the biggest source of innovative finance. At the global level, the most
promising new sources for public finance are taxes on international aviation and
shipping and a Financial Transaction Tax. However, the revenues stemming
from both these sources would ideally require global agreements in order to
avoid competitiveness issues, which have so far not been achieved.
The carbon market will be a key element for mobilising funding at the required
scale. Stringent emissions reduction targets will be required to create enough
demand for offset credits and to support a robust carbon price. The higher the
carbon price, the bigger the revenue and the stronger the price signal to reduce
emissions. The post-2012 strategy is two-fold: to substantially reform the CDM
globally, which should focus mainly on LDCs; and, to promote the development
of sectoral carbon market mechanisms in economically more advanced coun-
tries. These sectoral carbon markets should allow these countries to scale up
private investments in key competitive sectors.
It is increasingly recognised that the majority of climate finance will need to
come from the private sector. Private investment flows are crucial not only to
bring developing countries towards a low-carbon future, but also to protect
investments through adaptation measures. These investments can be stimulated
through a more efficient use of public instruments in order to improve the gen-
eral business environment, support risk-sharing instruments, and provide reve-
nue support through concessional loans, grants and guarantees. Strengthening
the public-private sector dialogue is therefore crucial in order to leverage addi-
tional green investments.
The multilateral development banks, which are important channels of climate
finance to developing countries, can play a significant multiplier role in leverag-
ing both public and private finance. Apart from this leveraging role, they also
have a track record of providing technical assistance as well as financial and
sector expertise. Therefore, the capacity of these banks should be strengthened
through innovative financing instruments to leverage additional resources over
the course of the next decade.
One of the most critical issues present in negotiations on climate financing
remains the establishment of a common baseline against which the funds mobi-
lised can be considered as “new and additional”. Regarding fast start financing,
each developed countries, according to its national interests, has given its own
definition of how much its financial contribution is “new” in comparison to its
previous pledges and “additional” to its existing ODA commitment. Without a
commonly agreed baseline, future financial contributions cannot be deemed
credible. A clear definition of what constitutes new and additional climateFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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finance is needed to establish clear common rules on the MRV of climate fund-
ing, which are paramount to ensure accountability and mutual trust between
developed and developing countries. However, given the important role that
ODA will continue to play as a source of climate finance in the short term, an
agreement on a common definition seems difficult to reach in a near future.
In a nutshell, the AGF report proposed a lot of innovative ways to mobilise new
and additional climate funding in the long-term. However, the debate on the
sources of climate financing touches on highly contentious and political issues,
which will not be solved by the next COP in Durban at the end of the year.
Therefore, mobilising $100 billion annually seems feasible yet extremely diffi-
cult.
Administrating climate funding
Both bilateral and multilateral climate funds will be required to manage the
scaled-up funding. During the last few years, many new multilateral and bilat-
eral climate funds have been established in order to develop new ways of chan-
nelling international climate financing. This has increased the complexity and
the coordination of international support as well as the transaction costs for the
recipients.
In Cancun, the decision was taken to establish a new Green Climate Fund (GCF)
under the guidance of the UNFCCC. The governance structure of the fund pro-
vides for equitable representation of developed and developing countries. How-
ever, many fundamental questions need to be answered rapidly, such as what
funding windows, what access modalities and how the fund is going to interact
with existing funds. Despite the addition of another new fund in the intricate
network of multilateral and bilateral funds, the GFC is deemed to simplify,
rationalise and complement this complex structure. The EU’s experience in fast
start finance has already shown that a common European strategy is difficult to
reach due to the preference of some donor countries for channelling funds
according to their own interests. Therefore, a pragmatic approach is required.
As it is unlikely that the GCF will replace existing initiatives, a new hierarchy
under the guidance of the UNFCCC could be established with an appropriate
division of labour amongst the different climate funds in order to increase com-
plementarity and reduce transaction costs. This division of labour implies a cer-
tain level of coordination between the funds on the geographical distribution of
funding, the balance of the allocation of funds between mitigation and adapta-
tion or the most appropriate use of multiple sources of funding. Therefore, if theFINANCING THE ANSWER TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGING BUT FEASIBLE
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GCF wants to administrate the majority of new and additional climate funding
by 2013, it will have to innovate and complement existing initiatives.
For a more efficient, coherent and coordinated approach towards the adminis-
tration of climate funds, enhanced transparency and accountability are essen-
tial. The MRV of climate finance must therefore be enhanced under a clear and
comprehensive framework. This is the prerequisite for “a global trust, unity and
action”99, which will ensure the long-term success of climate financing. How-
ever, as long as there is no clear definition of what counts as “climate finance”,
it will be difficult to monitor, report and verify it.
Delivering climate funding
Fund delivery is fundamental when assessing the effectiveness, efficiency and
equity of climate finance. A key challenge is to better determine funding needs
according to priority climate actions in developing countries. In order to do so,
‘national ownership’ must be increasingly secured through ‘direct access’ to
funding for recipient countries. This requires early financial support in order to
build up institutional capacity so that recipient countries can absorb and use
new financial flows effectively.
An equitable and balanced allocation of financing poses many challenges. First,
an equitable allocation of funds between developing countries will prove diffi-
cult due to the inclination of investors to seek profitability and cost effective-
ness. Public finance must thus be prioritised in the most vulnerable countries.
Furthermore, the balanced allocation between mitigation and adaption required
by the Cancun Agreements should be interpreted as being close to 50% for
adaptation and mitigation each. In addition, a serious effort must be made to
deliver the fund in a timely manner so as to address the wide current gap
between pledged and disbursed funds. Finally, it is widely recognized that
finance for adaptation should be provided in the form of grants, not repayable
loans.

To conclude, although progress has been achieved in the administration of funds
in Cancun, many issues remain unresolved. A balanced administration of cli-
99. K. LVOVSKY, “Making the Most of Climate Finance: A Development Perspective”, International Insti-
tute for Sustainable Development, 18 February 2010, http://climate-l.iisd.org/guest-articles/making-the-
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mate financing is of little value without the necessary sources to mobilise the
amount of funding required and without the needed capacity to deal with the
delivery of scaled-up funding in developing countries. Negotiations involving
financial issues always touch upon sensitive questions. Therefore, pragmatism
and good will are and will be fundamental ingredients to overcome this chal-
lenge.